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[A]n American judge can pronounce a decision only when litigation has arisen, he is conversant with special cases, and he cannot act until the cause has been duly brought before the court.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative law—whether instantiated in judicial decisionmaking, law practice, or academic work on administrative law—is
rooted in reading cases. The role of cases in judicial decisionmaking,
and in lawyering that depends in no small part upon predicting judi-

* Professor, Department of Economics, University of California at Irvine; Professor,
University of Southern California Law School. Professor Cohen gratefully acknowledges
the support of the Olin Foundation and the generosity and hospitality of the USC Law
School during the preparation of this study. The authors also thank the participants of the
Administrative and Regulatory Law Symposium, particularly Professors Jim Rossi and
Daniel Gifford, for their helpful comments on this Article.
** Carl Mason Franklin Professor of Law and Dean, University of Southern California Law School.
1. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE , DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA at ch. VI, 99-100 (Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc. 1945) (1835).
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cial decisionmaking, is so obvious as to require no documentation.
The case method, rooted in analogical reasoning, suffuses the area.2
Cases fill different roles in different types of scholarship. In historical review, 3 the cases represent part of the record to which we
turn to find out “what happened.” In evaluations of courts’ statutory
interpretations, 4 we read the cases to understand a court’s reading of
the statute in question. When we directly critique the structure of
judicial review of agency action,5 we read the cases and the corresponding regulatory actions to deduce the relationship between judicial review and administrative behavior. When we puzzle through
the implications of emphasizing presidential authority for New Deal
regulation,6 we seek to understand how cases approving of this em2. See, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING
25-26 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV . L. REV . 741, 745
(1993).
3. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Administrative Procedure Act and Regulatory Reform: A Reconciliation, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM . U. 35, 43-48 (1996) (arguing that recent APA
reform proposals can be harmonized with the larger, historical purposes of the APA);
Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory Model: A History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68 MINN. L. REV . 299, 324-27 (1983); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law , 88 HARV . L. REV . 1669, 1760-90 (1975). See generally Gary
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV . 1231 (1994)
(analyzing how the modern administrative state is unconstitutional); Daniel B. Rodriguez,
Jaffe’s Law: An Essay on the Intellectual Underpinnings of Modern Administrative Law
Theory, 72 CHI .-KENT L. REV . 1159 (1997) (analyzing intellectual history); Richard B.
Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI . L. REV . 335 (1990) (analyzing the administration of the administrative state).
4. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget
Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV . 871 (1999) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s evaluation of the Line Item Veto Act); Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and
Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023 (1998) (highlighting the importance of background principles of administrative law in construing administrative law
statutes); Katherine L. Vaughns, A Tale of Two Opinions: The Meaning of Statutes and the
Nature of Judicial Decision-Making in the Administrative Context, 1995 BYU L. REV . 139
(examining the D.C. Circuit’s review of immigration law interpretations by the INS).
5. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV . 1253, 1256 (1988) (explaining that the Constitution circumscribes
powers to government branches by limiting the capabilities of the other branches); Thomas
O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385,
1385 (1992) (explaining that agencies have attempted to ensure that rules are capable of
withstanding judicial scrutiny); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial
Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of
the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 8 (1991) (analyzing how judicial review has caused policy
paralysis); Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal
Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV . 763, 766
(criticizing Pierce, supra); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent
Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV.
483, 514 (1997) (defending the hard look doctrine).
6. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 HARV . J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227, 227 (1998); Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power
in the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or
Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV . 827, 841-44 (1996); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1182 (1994); Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to

2000]

GOVERNMENT LITIGANT ADVANTAGE

393

phasis change the behavior of the agencies and other branches of
government. Indeed, the emphasis on reading cases has led to the
urge to prescribe canons of statutory construction for courts to use. 7
Modern “high brow” work in administrative law—work that often
merges with constitutional law—tends to use political, constitutional,
and social theory as major premises in structuring arguments. Theory may play several different roles, but it cannot supplant reading
the cases. Theory’s biggest task is to reconcile administrative agencies with democratic constitutional theory.8 Theory may give us, in
some way, the nature of good doctrine in this area 9—an idea of how
things ought to be. At least theory tells us which sets of doctrines are
acceptable. 10 Theory may also try to reconcile administrative law
with justifications for regulation. 11 At any rate, we then read the
Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV . 1, 1 (1994); Peter L.
Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI .-KENT. L. REV . 965, 967-68 (1997).
7. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 111-12 (1990). For a trenchant critique, see Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Jurisprudence: Canons Redux?, 79 CALIF. L. REV . 807 (1991) (book review).
8. See Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV . 1123 (1997) (noting that constitutional law provides rules for the government); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV . L. REV . 1512 (1992) (using civic republican
theory to provide a justification for the modern administrative state). For an extremely
cranky view of the role of theory in legal academic work, see Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV . 34, 36
(1992) (“Our law reviews are now full of mediocre interdisciplinary articles. Too many law
professors are ivory tower dilettantes, pursuing whatever subject piques their interest,
whether or not the subject merits scholarship, and whether or not they have the scholarly
skills to master it.”). Judge Edwards also makes the good point that legal doctrine, rooted
partly in cases, must be part of good legal work, applying theory to law. See id. at 37.
9. See Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political
Ideology, 1991 DUKE L.J. 561, 561 (describing the realm of legal theory as “the source of
most prescriptions for the reform of legal doctrines and institutions”); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV . 1, 2 (1997) (suggesting that, among other things, judicial review needs to be less intrusive to allow administration to achieve “collaborative governance”).
10. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV . 759, 760 (1997) (arguing that
we must get beyond Bickel’s “Least Dangerous Branch” paradigm); Cynthia R. Farina, The
Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI .-KENT L. REV.
987, 987 (1997) (finding more difficulties in the legitimization of administrative action);
Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV . 795, 800 (1999) (finding
relative to Farina, see supra, little conflict between democratic theory and delegation of
power to administrative agencies).
11. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW : RETHINKING JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); JERRY MASHAW , G REED, CHAOS AND G OVERNANCE
(1997) (arguing for a middle ground between public choice theory’s proponents and detractors); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process,
98 COLUM . L. REV . 1 (1998). For an insightful critique of Mashaw’s simultaneous overt distrust and sophisticated use of social choice theory, see Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice
and the Legal Academy , 86 GEO. L.J. 1075 (1998) (book review). See also Cynthia R. Farina, Getting From Here to There, 1991 DUKE L.J. 689, 694-95 (attempting to chart a research agenda for administrative law once process and substance have been irrevocably
joined); Jim Rossi, Public Choice Theory and the Fragmented Web of the Contemporary
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cases to see if the law conforms to the theoretical ideal, and if not,
whether the deviations are large.
A new branch of administrative law scholarship attempts to apply
“Positive Political Theory” (PPT) to administrative law and agencies. 12 Under the framework of PPT, the cases assume several roles.
In many articles, particular cases provide examples that undergird
the analysis. 13 In others, cases are used as intentional manipulations
by the justices to get outcomes they want. 14
For virtually all of these purposes, we read administrative law
cases in the Supreme Court. For the most part, we assume that the
cases we see are the cases that we “should” see. 15 From that starting
point, lower court judges attempt to deduce the law to be applied,
lawyers attempt to predict the behavior of judges (of both the lower
courts and the Supreme Court), and academics do whatever we do.
What if our assumption that we see the cases that we “should” see
is wrong? Perhaps the set of cases we get to see is filtered before we
get to see them. What if the set of cases that the Supreme Court gets
to decide is biased by the actions of someone not on the Court? It

Administrative State, 96 MICH. L. REV . 1746, 1749 (1998) (book review) (pointing out
Mashaw’s tendency to criticize and utilize public choice theory without a satisfying overarching theory of how to do so).
12. See Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES . L. REV . 757 (1996) (analyzing how
a legislative record contains signals about a statute’s meaning); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV . 1210 (1992) (showing that race-to-the-bottom
arguments have no support in present models of interjurisdictional competition, and if
they had support over environmental standards, then federal regulation would not play an
integral role); Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of Judicial Review: An
Evaluation of Proposals to Restrict Pre-enforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58 O HIO ST.
L.J. 85 (1997) (applying “game theoretic” analysis to refine Mashaw and Harfst’s proposal
to delay judicial review of rulemaking).
13. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 passim (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 G EO. L.J. 523, 523-28 (1992); McNollgast, Politics
and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV . 1631, 1671-73 (1996).
14. See John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes—Strategic Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992) (arguing that courts interpret statutes to favor one
legislature over another). Of course, there are parts of academic administrative law where
reading cases does not seem to loom large. See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decision-Making in the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV . J. ON LEGIS . 387 (1998)
(arguing the need to reconsider and possibly revamp the federal budget process); Jonathan
R. Macey, Lawyers in Agencies: Economics, Social Psychology, and Process, L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS ., Spring 1998, at 109 (citing no cases); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI . L. REV . 1 (1995) (reviewing executive orders
12,291 and 12,498). These areas of academic administrative law, while crucial to the full
study of our subject, will not be the topic of our inquiry.
15. Of course there are table decisions, but we assume that the Court has decided
that they are not important enough to merit our attention.
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would affect the accuracy and legitimacy of all the reasons for which
we read cases.
In this Article, we present both theory and evidence that the strategic behavior of government litigators routinely alters the set of
cases from which the Supreme Court gets to choose. This advantage
works in favor of the government—the Supreme Court gets to decide
cases in which the government has a large chance of victory. As a
consequence, our administrative common law in the Supreme Court
is tilted toward the government.
The notion that a petitioner’s actions might constrain the Supreme Court’s agenda may appear unlikely given low certiorari success rates. Fewer than one hundred cases are now granted certiorari
per year, out of over three thousand petitions, suggesting that the
Supreme Court has plenty of choices. 16 As opposed to a lack of material constraining the Court, Richard Posner writes that a surfeit of
cases (and inadequate judicial resources) reduces the power and effectiveness of the judicial branch.17 However, the federal government
is typically successful, receiving certiorari for 60% or more of its petitions year in and year out. 18 This statistic, vastly at odds with the
success rate in the population of certiorari petitions, indicates that
the Solicitor General’s Office is highly selective in choosing which
cases to appeal to the Supreme Court. Indeed, to the extent that the
federal government’s success rate in obtaining Supreme Court review
has been investigated, it has been ascribed to presenting the Supreme Court with only the most important cases. 19 The Solicitor
General is usually credited with helping out the Supreme Court by
prescreening possibilities and petitioning only the type of cases likely
to be granted certiorari. 20
Our analysis is not at odds with this conclusion, but it goes further by suggesting that, far more than the typical appellant in cases
16. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM , ADMINISTRATIVE O FFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ,
1998 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 89
tbl.A1, http://www.uscourts.gov/dirrpt98/a01sep98.pdf.
17. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS : CRISIS AND REFORM 129 (1985);
see also McNollgast, supra note 13, at 1638 (asserting that engineering a judicial resource
crunch (either fewer judges or more cases) is a deliberate strategy used by the other
branches of government when convenient and feasible).
18. See REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 25
(1992).
19. A substantial body of literature investigates how the Supreme Court sets its
agenda by choosing cases to review. As far as we are aware, these studies all assume that
the Court is not constrained in its choices by its petitioners. Classic studies include
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING (Glendon Schubert et al. eds., 1963); Sydney S. Ulmer, The
Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 AM . POL. SCI.
REV . 901, 901-11 (1979); and, using a very different methodology, H.W. PERRY, JR.,
DECIDING TO DECIDE 216-270 (1991).
20. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda Building in
the Supreme Court, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV . 809, 815-17 (1990).
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with federal respondents, 21 the Solicitor General declines to petition
for certiorari in some cases which the Supreme Court would also like
to hear; that is, the screening process applied by the government
might be so extremely selective as to change the Supreme Court’s
menu of cases. Our argument rests on considerations that are standard in rational choice studies of legal appeals. As we will show,
there are major asymmetries between the costs and benefits of cases
appealed by private litigants and the costs and benefits of cases appealed by government litigants. These asymmetries arise from the
institutional structure of the federal judiciary and from administrative judicial review. As a result, the incentives to pursue Supreme
Court review differ enormously between the U.S. government and
other parties.
None of our analysis should be understood as making any claims
about the big normative question in the area: Is the governmentpetitioner advantage22 good or bad? The ability of the U.S. government to gain an advantage at the Supreme Court through litigation
strategy might be a good thing, a bad thing, or morally neutral. Answering the big question would require confronting questions about
whether the decisions of the Solicitor General have moral force independent from decisions of the rest of the executive branch; whether
the executive branch, as a unitary whole, has a constitutional role in
interpreting statutes and the constitution, perhaps through manipulating litigation; whether the strategic behavior of the Supreme
Court justifies strategic behavior by the executive branch; whether
strategic litigation behavior by the executive branch is morally acceptable; and so on. Professors Gifford and Rossi, in their comments
on our Article,23 do an admirable job of starting the rather complex
conversation needed to parse these moral problems. We take no position on the moral and normative questions, resting with a purely descriptive task—describing a feature of modern administrative law
adjudication.
In Part II of this Article, we present our theory of why a government advantage should exist. In Part III, we discuss empirical evi-

21. The certiorari success rate for petitions with federal respondents average is less
than 4% per year, which is consistent with the claim that the government is more careful
with its appeals than are other parties. See SALOKAR, supra note 18. This statistic is further consistent with a selection effect in that it establishes that not all (or most) cases involving the federal government are worthy of Supreme Court review.
22. The government-petitioner advantage refers to the U.S. government’s greater
chance of victory at the Supreme Court level.
23. See Daniel J. Gifford, Why Does a Conservative Court Rule in Favor of a Liberal
Government? The Spitzer-Cohen Analysis and the Constitutional Scheme, 28 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV . 427 (2000); Jim Rossi, Does the Solicitor General Advantage Thwart the Rule of Law
in the Administrative State?, 28 FL. ST. U. L. REV . 459 (2000).
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dence that supports the existence of a government advantage. In
Part IV, we discuss implications for administrative law.
II. GOVERNMENT A DVANTAGE
An apparent government advantage could exist for several reasons. First, the government may diverge from private litigants in its
petitioning behavior. Another possibility is that the Supreme Court
is in general more progovernment than are circuit courts. Third, the
government may, in general, do a better job at preparing and arguing
its case before the Supreme Court than do other litigants. Each of
these possibilities is considered below.
A. Suit and Settlement in Public Law
We follow the standard law and economics analytic framework
and assume that a potential appellant appeals only on the expectation of gain, and an appellant considers, in addition to the benefits of
winning or costs of losing, the likelihood of success on appeal, the
costs of further litigation, and the settlement opportunities. Our
analysis focuses on two distinctions between the way that the federal
government and other litigants evaluate these parameters: the first
relates to the enhanced ability of the federal government to internalize externalities of Supreme Court decisions, and the second relates
to differential authority of lower court decisions over the federal government vis-à-vis private litigants.
1. The Scale and Scope of Supreme Court Decisions
Our analysis builds on the function that the Supreme Court plays
in the judicial hierarchy. As H.W. Perry documents in his extensive
study of certiorari, the Supreme Court does not believe its role is to
correct errors of lower courts or even to ensure justice, but rather, as
Justice Vinson wrote, “to resolve conflicts of opinion on federal questions that have arisen among lower courts, to pass upon questions of
wide import under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States, and to exercise supervisory power over lower federal courts.”24
Implications of this characterization of Supreme Court decisions are
that the decisions typically have greater scope and scale than the appellate decision under review and that they are likely to affect agencies, companies, or individuals not party to the original suit. Indeed,
externalities of scope or scale might be considered a prerequisite for
Supreme Court review.

24. PERRY, supra note 19, at 36 (quoting Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, Remarks Before the American Bar Association (Sept. 7, 1949)).
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The federal government, to a much greater extent than other litigants, can take account of these externalities when it decides
whether or not to pursue litigation. The federal government’s range
of activities, like the reach of Supreme Court decisions, is national in
scale. If, for example, a litigant with local operations appealed a circuit court decision and the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court,
the litigant would have merely lost litigation costs relative to his position prior to the appeal; the “loss” in court (net of litigation costs)
would be the same whether the Supreme Court heard (and affirmed)
the case or not. The executive branch, similarly situated, might have
to modify operations not only within the original circuit but also in
other parts of the country.
This discrepancy continues to hold even when the nongovernmental litigant is national, as is frequently the case in Supreme Court
litigation, or when the case originates from the exclusive jurisdiction
caseload of either the Federal Circuit Court or the executive branch
agencies. 25 The Chevron decision, which came to the D.C. Court of
Appeals under its exclusive jurisdiction, illustrates the point. 26 The
Chevron decision established a standard of greater judicial deference
to the executive branch that applied across the entire range of administrative actions, as well as upholding the EPA regulation that
defines a “source” for purposes of pollution abatement standards. 27
Two prominent, recent cases illustrate the differential incentives
of federal and other parties similarly situated as potential petitioners. 28 In both of these cases, the federal government argued against
certiorari, although its denial would automatically uphold appellate

25. The circuit courts that have exclusive jurisdiction receive national precedential
authority for their decisions. See Richard Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV . 1111, 1111 (1990). The national precedential
authority includes appeals of patent cases by the Federal Circuit Court and appeals of
cases related to aspects of the clean air and broadcasting regulation by the D.C. Circuit
Court. See id. at 1123-25. The Federal Circuit Court also has exclusive jurisdiction over
cases involving claims against the federal government; however, these cases often involve
issues related to tax cases heard by other circuit courts, limiting the national precedential
value of the cases. See id. at 1112. Exclusive jurisdiction cases are very rarely granted certiorari and heard by the Supreme Court, perhaps because of the diminished possibility for
intercircuit conflicts. See id. at 1158-61. For a comprehensive discussion of exclusive jurisdiction, see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts
and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV . 1 (1989); Revesz, supra.
26. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844-45 (1984).
27. See id. Very extensive literature analyzes the nature and implications of this decision. See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action:
A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV . 431, 433 (1996).
28. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Shalala, 104 F.3d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
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court decisions against the government.29 In the fall of 1997, the Piscataway, New Jersey, Board of Education unexpectedly settled with
a white high school teacher, Ms. Taxman, who had successfully sued
the school board by claiming that her layoff was based on illegal racial discrimination.30 Both a federal district court 31 and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals (where the Board of Education was joined
by the EEOC in arguing for the legality of the district’s retention
policies) 32 had agreed with Ms. Taxman’s claim—the latter awarding
her back wages and punitive damages of over $400,000.33
In 1997, the Piscataway Board of Education petitioned for Supreme Court review. 34 The Clinton Administration, concerned that a
Supreme Court decision would have a negative impact on efforts
elsewhere in the country to promote diversity through policies like
those of the Piscataway Board of Education, argued unsuccessfully
that the Supreme Court should decline to review the case. 35 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 36 In November 1997, the Black Leadership Forum, hoping to avoid the anticipated national precedent, offered to pay 70% of the settlement if the Piscataway Board of Education would drop the case, which it did. 37 Newspaper articles called the
move a “tactical retreat”; affirmative action opponents claimed that
the rights groups “ducked a fight.”38 Of course, sooner or later such a
case might make it to the Supreme Court. The Black Leadership Forum was hoping for later.39
An analogous issue arose during 1997 when the National Research Council (NRC) (the operating arm of the National Academy of
Sciences) lost a series of court appeals to the Animal Legal Defense
Fund, which argued that its members had been illegally barred from
NRC meetings and that the NRC was subject to the Federal Advisory
Committee Act 40 (FACA). 41 The NRC appealed the case from the D.C.
29. See Linda Greenhouse, Settlement Ends High Court Case of Preferences, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at A1; Andrew Lawler, Government Bows Out of Academy Case,
SCIENCE , Oct. 3, 1997, at 28.
30. See Greenhouse, supra note 29; see also Barry Bearak, Rights Groups Ducked a
Fight, Opponents Say , N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at A1.
31. See United States v. Board of Educ., 832 F. Supp. 836, 851 (D.N.J. 1993).
32. See 91 F.3d at 1565-66.
33. See id.; see also 832 F. Supp. at 851; Greenhouse, supra note 29.
34. See Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997) (granting
certiorari).
35. See Greenhouse, supra note 29; see also Bearak, supra note 30.
36. See Piscataway , 521 U.S. at 1117.
37. See Greenhouse, supra note 29; see also Bearak, supra note 30.
38. Bearak, supra note 30.
39. See Greenhouse, supra note 29.
40. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1998) (requiring federal “advisory committees” to maintain
public records and have public meetings).
41. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Shalala, 104 F.3d 424, 426 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
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Circuit to the Supreme Court and asked the Justice Department to
file a petition supporting the appeal and the Academy.42 The Justice
Department declined to file a supporting petition because of concern
that a Supreme Court review would jeopardize previous rulings that
exempted some committees from FACA, and would perhaps open up
other committees that had escaped FACA notice. 43 At the time, a Justice Department “source” told Science magazine that “there was a lot
of pressure from the agencies [to join the case], but if we got a bad
result from the court, the ramifications weren’t limited to the academy.”44 The Supreme Court denied certiorari, letting the lower court
decision stand. 45 In a further twist, Congress then passed, and the
President signed, a bill that exempted the NRC from the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 46
While these cases illustrate the difference in costs of losing, they
may perhaps appear of limited practical importance. In the Piscataway case, the local party (the Board of Education), because of the intervention of the Black Leadership Forum, pursued the strategy that
would have been taken by a national interest. 47 The Coase Theorem
teaches us that externalities are relevant to litigation only in the
presence of transaction costs. 48 Externalities create asymmetric costs
and benefits only if the two sides to the litigation are also asymmetrically able to internalize the externalities. 49 That is, the effort required to take account of the externalities must be more costly for
one of the litigants than the other. 50 It seems plausible to assert that
the government would have lower transaction costs and be successful
more often in internalizing external costs (or benefits) of appeals.
The Black Leadership Forum intervention is unusual. National interests like the National Resource Defense Council, which pursued
the Chevron case, are frequently involved in Supreme Court cases,
but these organizations have narrower constituencies than the federal government. The final Part of this Article considers in more detail the extent of the difference in the scope of interests between the
42. See Lawler, supra note 29, at 28.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. See National Academy of Sciences v. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc., 522 U.S.
949 (1997).
46. See Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-153,
111 Stat. 2689 (1997) (exempting the NRC from FACA but with other kinds of sunshine restrictions). Examining the strategies to appeal and accept appeals of all the actors is well
beyond this Article. It is interesting, however, to speculate about this case and whether the
Supreme Court was cognizant of the likelihood of statutory reversal at the hands of Congress by its denial of certiorari. On the general issue of statutory overrides, see generally
Eskridge, supra note 13.
47. See Greenhouse, supra note 29; see also Bearak, supra note 30.
48. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
49. See id. at 44.
50. See id.
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two parties in typical cases. Another difference, critical to our empirical formulation, however, is institutional. In contrast to other
parties, the federal government not only starts with the advantage
that it is, in its entirety, national in scale and broad in scope, but the
government, through the activities of the Department of Justice and
the Office of the Solicitor General, has institutionalized a mechanism
to manage the appellate caseload that accounts for interjurisdictional
externalities.
The Department of Justice handles most government litigation. 51
The specific relationship between the Justice Department lawyers
and the lawyers who work in the administrative agencies is important to both the argument and the empirical analysis in the following
Part. 52 Litigation in federal district courts may be conducted by either Department of Justice (DOJ) or agency lawyers.53 In either
event, the decision to litigate is effectively at the discretion of the
agency (and, of course, its opposing party).54 Appeals follow a different pattern. DOJ lawyers are generally involved in all appeals before
circuit courts of appeal. 55 Any appeal by the government requires the
approval of the Office of the Solicitor General, which approves only a
modest fraction (around one quarter, according to Horowitz) of appeal requests by agencies. 56 Alternatively, DOJ lawyers routinely advise agency lawyers or undertake a defense themselves when an
agency is the defendant in a case before an appellate court; this litigation requires no formal review by the Solicitor General. 57 Finally,
51. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE JUROCRACY: GOVERNING LAWYERS , AGENCY
PROGRAMS, AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 1 (1977).
52. Some exceptions to the characterization in the text exist, most often when the
Justice Department asserts litigating authority and an agency disagrees. See, e.g., Mail
Order Ass’n of America v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (denying DOJ’s challenge to U.S. Postal Service’s attempt to represent itself in appeal of a Postal
Rate Commission order), discussed in Patricia Wald, “For the United States”: Government
Lawyers in Court, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS ., Winter 1998, at 107, 127 & n.83; Federal Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88 (1994) (restricting the ability of
the Federal Election Commission to seek certiorari without the approval of the Solicitor
General), discussed in Alane Tempchin, Note & Comment, Fall From Grace: Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund and the Demise of the FEC’s Independent
Litigating Authority, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM . U. 385, 403-08 (1996).
53. See HOROWITZ, supra note 51, at 39-44.
54. See id. at 6.
55. See id. at 44-45.
56. See id. at 48.
57. See id. at 63. Horowitz offers several arguments for the distinction: the need to
maintain reasonable relations with district court judges who have ruled in favor of the
government and might be put off if the government abandoned the case; support for the
government lawyers who successfully tried the case; and avoidance of conflict with an
agency, which, fresh from a victory in a district court, might be unpersuaded by an argument from the DOJ that the case lacks merit. See id. The same features are credited with
the government’s relative enthusiasm for pursuing Supreme Court cases as defendant
rather than plaintiff, although in that forum the Solicitor General is virtually always involved. See Wald, supra note 52, at 127.
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the Solicitor General files all petitions for certiorari and litigates essentially all government cases before the Supreme Court. 58
The centralized litigating authority of the DOJ responds to a need
perceived by Congress (and others) for consistency in the federal position in litigation. 59 The issue is revisited periodically due to conflict
between agencies and the DOJ and due to dissatisfaction outside the
executive branch with the DOJ’s handling of cases. The usual conclusion is that the system, if flawed, is necessary. The need for consistency and the centralization response relate directly to our discussion
of externalities. While the federal government only rarely finds itself
in direct litigation against itself, 60 the immediate litigation interests
of different agencies frequently are at odds with the positions of
other agencies; other parts of the executive; or the longer-run goals,
interests, or reputation of the government as litigator. Such discrepancies are usually at the root of decisions by the DOJ to forego appeals. 61 By foregoing appeals, the DOJ internalizes litigation externalities for the executive branch of government.
2. Federal Administrative Agencies and the Lower Federal Courts
The preceding discussion suggests that the government (for example, the executive branch of the government) may routinely calculate the costs and benefits of a Supreme Court defeat or victory differently from other litigants. By internalizing broader impacts of a
decision, both the costs and benefits may be larger for the federal
government than for other litigants. This does not by itself imply
that success rates would be different if both costs and benefits increase proportionately and then that no change in appellate strategy
would result. However, other features of the system contribute to
such a conclusion.
One feature that contributes to this conclusion is that the cost to
the federal government of staying with a loss at a district court, or
even circuit court, can be modest. 62 Indeed, a significant part of the
external benefits from a victory at the Supreme Court fade when the
differential treatment of the executive branch by the lower courts is
taken into account. When the government loses a case in a lower
court, the government is obligated to alter its behavior only toward
the particular plaintiff in the suit; the government will not have to
change practices relative to similarly situated individuals in other
58. See HOROWITZ, supra note 51, at 47.
59. See id. at 6.
60. But see United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 377 U.S. 426 (1949); Wald,
supra note 52, at 127.
61. See generally HOROWITZ, supra note 51, at chs. 2, 7.
62. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 699-702 (1989).
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circuits, to analogous activities in other agencies, or even to identically situated individuals in the same circuit. 63
Administrative nonacquiescence (refusing to generally change
governmental behavior because of a loss in a lower court) has been
the subject of a substantial body of legal literature. 64 The logic of intercircuit nonacquiescence is straightforward. The Supreme Court,
among others, finds value in the lack of intercircuit stare decisis. 65
Divergent opinions in the circuit courts signal difficulties in interpreting laws and changing social values or norms, and these opinions
allow “percolation” of issues, providing valuable signals and information to the Supreme Court about which issues it should review. 66
Moreover, when a circuit court invalidates some administrative practice, the law is presumed to be in a state of flux, hence the availability of further review.67 If administrative agencies changed national
regulations in response to a single circuit decision, they would curtail
the ability of other courts to issue divergent opinions. 68 Furthermore,
on occasions when the circuits disagree, an agency would be in an
impossible situation, needing to institute conflicting regulations nationwide. 69
Once the principle of intercircuit nonacquiescence is accepted, the
far more controversial intracircuit form is close at hand. One set of
justifications arises from the goal of the federal administrative agencies: to institute a national, standard regulatory regime. 70 In addition
to the obvious managerial problems associated with administering
conflicting regulations in different parts of the country, some form of
standardization was deemed desirable to justify federal, as opposed
to state, regulation in the first place. 71 For example, different standards of fair labor practices in different parts of the country might
promote an unfair basis for competition among businesses. 72 If an
63. See id. at 681 & n.1.
64. See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 25.
65. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 62, at 736-37.
66. A particularly insightful discussion of this issue and its relationship to the strategies open to the Supreme Court to manage the judicial hierarchy is contained in Peter L.
Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM . L. REV . 1093, 1095-96
(1987).
67. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 62, at 737-38.
68. See id. at 738.
69. Some proponents of nonacquiescence go further, arguing that while agencies must
defer to Supreme Court rulings, no such constitutional provision exists with respect to the
circuit courts. Both the circuit courts and the agencies are created by Congress; delegation
from Congress to the agencies means they need not defer to the circuit courts. See id. at
730.
70. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 62, at 695 & n.66, 720 & n.212.
71. See id. at 695 & n.66, 714 & n.186.
72. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1998) (protecting the
health, efficiency, and well-being of workers in working conditions).
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agency follows a circuit court’s directives by modifying regulations
within a circuit, but leaves them unchanged in other circuits, the
agency creates nonstandard regulatory regimes.
A second set of justifications arises from the structure of judicial
review for administrative law. In some cases, the identity of a reviewing court is not known beforehand.73 Some statutes (for example,
the National Labor Relations Act 74) allow a plaintiff to appeal a case
to courts in different circuits: the plaintiff’s own circuit, the circuit of
his place of business, or the circuit of the corporate headquarters of
his employer.75 Similarly, patent infringement suits may be initially
taken to a variety of districts with connections to the plaintiff, defendant, and both of their headquarters or research divisions. 76 While
the judiciary has tried to cut back on forum shopping, it is still the
case that some administrative actions can be appealed to a variety of
different circuit courts. 77 Agencies have argued that it is not possible
to determine ex ante which circuit’s decisions should be controlling.78
Hence, the arguments that justify intercircuit nonacquiescence,
when combined with the plaintiff’s ability to choose the circuit, may
also justify intracircuit nonacquiesence.
Not surprisingly, the various federal courts find the practice of
nonacquiescence deeply aggravating, but the practice persists and
has been upheld by the Supreme Court. 79 Patricia Wald, former Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in
an analysis of government lawyers in courts, conceded that:
[t]he conduct of government litigation in the courts of the United
States is sufficiently different from the conduct of private civil litigation in those courts so that what might otherwise be economy interests underlying a broad application of collateral estoppel are
outweighed by the constraints which particularly affect the Government. In short, collateral estoppel may not be applied against
the government if the parties are not the same. 80

Nonacquiesence can help alter the value of appeals to the federal
government, when compared to the costs and benefits of appeals to
private parties. If the costs of a Supreme Court loss are higher for
the government than they are for other litigants, and if the costs of
staying with a lower court loss are lower for the government than
they are for other litigants, then we would expect that, in deciding
73. See Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiesence, Cromwell v. Benson, and Administrative
Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815, 1818-19 & nn.6-10 (1989).
74. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1998).
75. See Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1819.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1984).
80. Wald, supra note 52, at 126 (quoting Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 162-63).
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whether to appeal, the government will require a higher likelihood of
success than other litigants. If enough cases fall into the category of
appeals that are unattractive to the federal government (an empirical issue) then the distortions in law discussed above may follow.
B. Progovernment Supreme Court: The Repeat Player
It is possible that the Supreme Court is more progovernment than
the circuit courts. This progovernment tendency might provide an
additional (and possibly complementary) explanation for the federal
government’s high success rate before the Supreme Court. Two main
explanations have been offered for the idea of progovernment tendencies. First, a closer policy relationship may exist between the government and the Supreme Court than between the government and
lower federal courts, where appointments are not subject to as much
scrutiny, particularly by the executive branch.81 Historically, U.S.
Senators and state political parties have had considerable influence
over the choice of circuit court nominees while the President has retained his nominating prerogative for the Supreme Court. 82
The second explanation arises from the special relationship between the Supreme Court and the Office of the Solicitor General. The
government’s frequent position as litigator and the very frequent
participation of the Solicitor General in front of the Supreme Court
have been offered as explanations of the very high success rates that
the government enjoys in that venue.83 There are multiple interpretations of the observation that repeat play breeds success. One view
is that it is simply repetition that breeds success by affording the repetitive litigant with knowledge about the workings of the courts and
the nature of winning arguments. 84 For example, McGuire claims
that this is all there is to the winning position of the government and
that no additional, special status is afforded the Solicitor General by
the judiciary.85

81. See ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY at ch. 4, 85124 (1971).
82. See id. at 100-01.
83. The classic text in this area is SCIGLIANO, supra note 81. More recent, excellent
discussions are contained in SALOKAR, supra note 18, and PERRY, supra note 19. Kevin T.
McGuire provides a somewhat iconoclastic view and a comprehensive survey of recent literature in Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme Court, POL. RES . Q., June
1998, at 505, 505-06.
84. See McGuire, supra note 83, at 505-06.
85. See id. McGuire’s analysis is based on a painstaking data collection where he
characterized the experience of the solicitors in all cases before the Supreme Court during
two terms and showed that the experience “benefit” accrued equivalently to government or
nongovernment litigants. He also ran a regression that attempted to measure whether the
Solicitor General additionally does a good job of selecting cases—what we are arguing here.
He did not find a “sele ction” effect beyond the “experience” effect. See id. at 522-23.
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Another aspect of repeat play is that it increases the value of a
good reputation.86 Repeat players will consequently attempt to develop a good reputation with hope that judges will know their reputation and be inclined to defer to them.87 Most of the time such players win because they are good, and some of the time they trade on
their reputation and win anyway.88
Finally, the most dignified version of the repeat-play hypothesis is
that government is in the courts a great deal and wins frequently because of its responsibilities to promote the public good.89 In this version, government lawyers and judges are to some degree on the same
team, balancing and checking each other as the Founders planned,
but still working towards similar goals and visions. 90 According to
Judge Wald, this view makes judges more demanding and critical of
government lawyers than of other litigants; nevertheless, the government appears well-treated by the courts. 91
For our purposes, the key feature of each of these hypotheses is
that they apply to government litigation regardless of whether the
government is the appellant or the appellee. If the courts defer to
litigants due to expertise, reputation, or a shared goal of furthering
the public good, and if these characteristics appear more often in
government litigants than in other litigants, then the courts will uphold the government position disproportionately more often. We
would not, however, conclude that the nature of cases nor the resulting case interpretations are in any sense unrepresentative of what
the courts would want. Our challenge then, empirically, is to distinguish this possibility—that progovernment tendencies of the SuOur analysis differs from his in two ways. First, he assumes that only cases in which the
government is the petitioner can benefit from the selection effect, ignoring the fact that selection occurs at the circuit court level. Hence, a fraction of cases in which the government
is the respondent before the Supreme Court might also have a selection effect. This correction is critical to our results. The second difference is a more subtle one: How should we interpret collinearity? It is entirely plausible that the more experienced lawyers agree only to
work on the “best” cases and that they, being experienced, have a good idea of what those
cases are. This applies to government and nongovernment cases. As a result, the correlation, which clearly exists in McGuire’s data (both the selection bias and the government
bias obtained without the experience variable, leading to a correlation of these measures)
might be due to selection rather than (or at least, in addition to) experience.
Finally, we note that our results are not entirely at odds with his: if any experienced litigant has an advantage, and the government is more often experienced, then the overall jurisprudential bias with which we are concerned continues to hold. By the same token, one
could argue correctly that sometimes nongovernmental litigants also internalize exte rnalities and when they do, they tend to win cases. Again, the bias holds if the government
does it much more often than anyone else.
86. See id. at 510.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 509.
90. See id.
91. See Wald, supra note 52, at 128.
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preme Court produce the high rates of success for the government in
the Supreme Court—from the possibility that more strategic behavior by the government in case selection produces the high rate of government success.
There is a critical assumption in the analysis that follows: neither
a close policy relationship between Supreme Court Justices nor any
of these repeat-play attributes distinguishes government as the petitioner from government as the respondent. The Solicitor General and
Supreme Court Justices are there in both cases. 92 In fact, Horowitz
suggests that appeals and defenses are treated very differently by
the Solicitor General’s office and by the DOJ more generally.93 Whatever the motivation for treatment, if the result is a selection of appeals, then the bias we hypothesize is a possibility. Clearly, however,
simply observing that the government tends to win is an inadequate
test. To the extent that these other reasons—policy relationship and
repeat-play relationship—hold, the government will tend to win more
often. Hence, we must seek evidence of disproportionate success
when the government is in the position of selecting cases for review,
over and above the high success it may enjoy due to expertise, cultivation of reputation, or policy consonance.
III. DOES THE GOVERNMENT CONSTRAIN THE SUPREME COURT?
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Part II discusses our theory of why the cases presented to the Supreme Court differ between government and private litigants. This
does not suggest, even at a theoretical level, that the litigants’
choices change the Supreme Court’s behavior. If the Supreme Court
were to be given a free choice of all the cases in the courts of appeal
to review, it might choose a set contained within the group appealed
by the government and private litigants. If this were to be true, then
the petitioning behavior of the parties would not affect the Supreme
Court’s selection of cases to hear and decide. Put differently, if the
government’s petitioning and settlement strategy constrains the Supreme Court’s activities, then the government must forego appealing
some cases the Supreme Court would like to hear and then affirm.
This Part proceeds in two steps. First, we provide an overview of
our econometric strategy, drawing on the traditional wisdom about
government litigation in the Supreme Court. Then, we discuss our
attempt to detect—empirically—a strategic government-petitioner
advantage94 beyond that suggested by the traditional wisdom.
92. See HOROWITZ, supra note 51, at 10.
93. See id. at 63.
94. We will not be able to distinguish between an abnormally high reversal rate for
government-petitioner cases and an abnormally high affirmance rate for governmentrespondent cases. Consequently, in this Part, we will refer to the advantage as a govern-
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A. Existing Studies and the Null Hypothesis
Studies of public litigation at the Supreme Court find that the
government tends to prevail and that it is more successful as the petitioner than as the respondent. 95 Table 1 below96 contains raw statistics about all full Supreme Court decisions between the 1985 and
1997 terms which were heard on appeal from a circuit court and in
which the Solicitor General was either a petitioner or a respondent,
or in which there was no government involvement.97 The pattern is
striking: the government wins in over 70% of the cases where it is
the petitioner, and it wins in just under 60% of the cases where it is
the respondent. The other party does better as the petitioner than as
the respondent as well but appears to be at a tremendous disadvantage in both roles, prevailing in only 40% of the cases as the petitioner and under 30% of the cases as the respondent.
This pattern appears to be consistent with strategic petitioning
and settlement by the government. However, it is also consistent
with a combination of two other hypotheses about the Supreme
Court’s strategic certiorari behavior that have been discussed in the
literature. The first hypothesis concentrates on the Supreme Court’s
managerial responsibilities. 98 The argument, in brief, is as follows.
The Supreme Court can only review a tiny proportion of the lower
court caseload. One strategy for allocating its scarce reviewing
“budget” is to grant certiorari preferentially to cases that appear to
be outliers—cases that are most at variance with the Supreme
Court’s preferences. If lower courts dislike being overturned on review (if, for instance, they wish to maximize their own policy influence by writing opinions that hold on appeal) and if they anticipate
that a decision substantially at variance with the preferences of the
Supreme Court is likely to attract the Court’s attention and be reviewed, then lower courts will attempt to avoid outlier decisions. The
Supreme Court can, in theory, greatly expand its authority by selectively reviewing outlier cases, as it then will encourage ex ante compliance with its preferences by the lower courts. The upshot of this

ment-petitioner advantage although it may arise from either the government’s petitioning
or settlement strategy.
95. See SALOKAR, supra note 18, at ch. 4.
96. Infra p. 422.
97. Omitted from this table are cases where the Solicitor General entered an amicus
brief either for the petitioner or the respondent. This choice was made to provide a “government-free” control group. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 27, at 431 & n.1, for more
details on the case selection choices.
98. See Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal -Agent
Model on Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM . J. POL. SCI . 673, 690-94 (1994).
The result is also consistent with traditional “cue theory,” in which error correction is a
factor in grants of certiorari. See Donald R. Songer, Concern for Policy Outputs as a Cue for
Supreme Court Decisions on Certiorari, 41 J. POL. 1185, 1185-94 (1979).
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strategy is to preferentially grant certiorari to cases that are likely to
be reversed.
Some direct evidence of this principal-agent strategy is provided
by Boucher and Segal, who show that justices who vote to grant certiorari are statistically more inclined subsequently to vote to reverse
the lower court than are the justices who voted against certiorari. 99
Certainly the aggregate pattern of case outcomes suggests such a factor. Note that in Table 1, reversals are more common than affirmances among cases with no government participation. For cases involving the government, both government and the private party are
more successful as the petitioner than as the respondent, although
among cases where the private party petitions for certiorari, affirmances are more common than reversals.
Figure 1100 shows the difference between the different reasons for
affirmance and reversal rates. In Figure 1, x is the “management” effect: the base rate at which the Supreme Court reverses the circuit
court in order to carry out its managerial functions. We would expect
this rate to vary with the extent of policy consonance between the
Supreme Court Justices and the judges on the appellate court under
review. Accordingly, this rate should vary depending on the year and
the circuit court from which a particular case originates.
In the results reported here, we separated x into two parts and estimated each in our regression equation. First, we used a constant
term. This constant picks up the overall tendency in the system to
reverse the circuit courts, regardless of the year in which the case
was decided or the circuit court from which the case came. Second,
we calculated the average rate at which the Supreme Court reversed
cases that did not involve the government as either the petitioner or
the respondent from the circuit court under review during the previous three years. We chose this strategy, first, to measure an effect
independent of government participation and, second, to avoid possible correlation to the cases under review in the current year. Three
previous years were chosen in order to have a sufficiently large sample of cases. Of course, this introduces some error into the measure
as the personnel of the courts change each year, albeit slowly. Because of the dearth of cases without government participation in the
D.C. Circuit, we included a dummy variable for that district, and we
defined the reversal rate for cases originating from that court as the
national average for the preceding three years.101
99. See Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic
Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL.
824, 833 (1995).
100. Infra p. 425.
101. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 27. We also report a “fixed effects” conditional
regression that, in effect, controls for each circuit and each year. The results of interest are
equivalent to those discussed here. This alternate specification has the advantage of a
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We need to control for a second possibility—that the Supreme
Court may be, in general, more progovernment than are the circuit
courts. 102 Recall the claims, reviewed in the previous Part of this Article, that the Solicitor General is held in high regard by the Justices,
a position which he enjoys by unusual competence, by litigating the
most before the Supreme Court, and by being the possible beneficiary
of the Supreme Court’s predilection to defer to the executive.103 This
hypothesis will be called the Solicitor General “deference effect” to
distinguish it from a strategic case selection advantage.104 All of the
government cases in our sample were litigated by the Office of the
Solicitor General. 105 Both of the explanations for government’s litigant advantage lead one to expect that the Supreme Court on its own
volition will grant certiorari more often to cases where the government is likely to prevail. Thus, the Court’s decisions will be progovernment, but its reviewing choices would not be constrained by the
government. The deference effect does not, on its own, suggest that
more intuitive fixed effect and also more data (the procedure reported here “wastes” three
years to construct the reversal rate coefficient) but is limited in ease of interpretation and
particularly in the ability to calculate predicted values.
102. The Supreme Court also reviews some decisions of state supreme courts and directly reviews some federal district court decisions. The logic that argues a progovernment
advantage of the U.S. Supreme Court relative to circuit courts applies more strongly to
these cases. We restrict our statistical analysis to cases appealed from circuit courts. Consequently, it is the relationship between the courts and the Supreme Court that is the focus of the discussion in this Part.
103. There is an enormous literature on this point. For a sample, see Symposium, The
Role and Function of the United States Solicitor General, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV . 1047 (1988).
104. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) may indeed be responsible for some or
all of the selection activities tested for in this study. The OSG reviews requests by most
government agencies who want to appeal cases to circuit courts and decides whether to petition for certiorari for cases decided adversely by the circuits. Functionally, cases go
through both an agency filter, which requests the OSG to appeal to a circuit or to petition
for certiorari, and the OSG filter. The OSG turns down most requests to ask for certiorari.
The logic that suggests selectivity by agencies (considering the externalities of affirmances)
applies perhaps more strongly to the OSG, which would consider interdepartmental exte rnalities as well as intradepartmental ones. We have no empirical way of distinguishing between advantages that arise from agency incentives and those that arise from the OSG in
this study. Thus, we lump the two together under the rubric of government advantages.
However, the subsequent Part returns to the question of reputation and motivation in the
selection criteria.
105. During the years covered by our sample, the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari to any cases brought directly by federal departments or agencies. Thus, this sample
includes all Supreme Court cases with a federal petitioner. During this period, as far as we
can tell, the Solicitor General always defended the federal government before the Supreme
Court. Consequently, we believe that we have a comprehensive set of cases involving the
federal government as either the petitioner or the respondent before the Supreme Court.
The formal ability of agencies to bring suits to the Supreme Court appears more diverse
than their practices. The right of agencies to appeal to circuit courts, as opposed to going
through the Solicitor General’s Office first for approval, varies in practice, but this complication is ignored in the current paper. For a game-theoretic analysis of the relationship between the Supreme Court and the Solicitor General, see Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L.
Spitzer, Including the Solicitor General, Part II (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors).
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the government would do even better as the petitioner than as the
respondent.
Figure 1 identifies the deference effect as y. When the government
is the petitioner, it enjoys a success rate of x+y. 106 When the government is the respondent, it can expect to lose cases at a rate of x-y,
which is less often than private party respondents (who lose at rate
x). Figure 1 also shows that we assume that the Solicitor General institutional advantage is symmetric around x. We expect the deference effect, y, to vary by year. For example, changes in the relative
policy positions of the Supreme Court, the President, and the agencies (which may involve Congress as well) may produce changes in y.
It may also vary depending on the issue area. For example, the Court
may be more inclined to defer on issues involving national security,
foreign affairs, or highly scientific debates than those addressing individual rights. 107
To detect the institutional advantage, we coded the cases “1” when
the government is the petitioner, “0” if there is no government involvement, and “-1” if the government is the respondent. Ceteris
paribus, we would expect the coefficient for this variable to be positive—reversals are more common when the government is the petitioner and less common when it is the respondent. In the regression
reported here, two complications are included: First, the variable
may vary by year to capture the changes discussed above. Second, we
coded cases to distinguish between two types of government cases.
Type I cases are those where the government petitioned to the circuit
court. All Type I cases passed through the Solicitor General filter
prior to the circuit court decision and prior to the petition for certiorari. Thus, in Type I cases, there may be selection effects present
whether the government is the respondent or the petitioner. Type II
cases, in contrast, are those where the government did not appeal to
the circuit court. In Type II cases, either the government won at the
district court, and so was the appellant at the circuit level, or the
case came on direct appeal from an administrative agency. Hence, in
Type II cases, the first opportunity for selection occurs at the certiorari petition level.
Finally, to detect a strategic component, we include a variable
that indicates whether the government has had the opportunity to
select the case under review. Figure 1 below shows this as z: if the
106. This figure is intended only to illustrate the idea behind our estimation. In fact,
our statistical approach utilizes a logit estimation that is nonlinear to take account of the
constraint that a probability must lie between zero and one. The estimation assumes that
the government bias is not linearly (or additively) symmetric, but rather in effect propo rtionately symmetric, taking account of the upper and lower bounds on a likelihood of reversal.
107. Variation by issue area is examined in Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 27, at 455.
There are systematic differences in deference as outlined here.
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government is the petitioner, then its success rate would be x+y+z, in
part due to the general success of petitioners granted certiorari (x), in
part due to its favored role as government litigant (y), and in part
due to strategic selection (z). If selection has no constraining effect on
the Supreme Court, we would estimate z to be zero. We only expect to
find a z effect in those cases where the first opportunity for strategic
selection is at the certiorari level, that is, in the Type II cases. Such
bias would be expected in all Type I cases or possibly be much
weaker if the selection is even narrower at the Supreme Court level
than the circuit court level. 108 Table 2 below109 reports success rates
by case type. Note that these numbers roughly correspond to the discussion in this Part, although this table cannot control for variation
in the management effect across circuits or terms.
B. Results of the Econometric Study
Table 3 contains the results of the logit estimation. We find
that, controlling for both a progovernment tendency and an underlying propensity to reverse lower courts, the government still is abnormally successful before the Supreme Court when the government
petitions for review. To restate this conclusion, the government succeeds more often as the petitioner before the Supreme Court than we
would predict on the basis of two regularities: petitioners tend to be
successful once their petitions are granted certiorari and the Supreme Court favors the government’s position more than do the circuit courts. The latter two effects can be interpreted as choices made
by the Supreme Court: its strategy in setting its certiorari agenda.
Additional success for the government in Type II cases runs counter
to the standard hypotheses about how the Supreme Court chooses its
agenda when unconstrained. It is consistent with our hypothesis that
the government is far more selective in its petitioning strategies than
are its adversaries before the federal courts.
We estimate the effect only for those cases where the government’s first opportunity to select out of appeal is at the Supreme
Court. While the same effect may hold for other cases, we cannot directly separate the institutional and strategic impacts for cases
where the government had the opportunity to select out of litigation
at the appellate level. Our sample consists of all cases heard by the
Supreme Court that came on appeal from a circuit court of appeals
from the 1987 and 1997 terms. To keep the possible reputational effect of the Solicitor General “clean,” we omitted from the sample any
110

108. Why the strategic selection effect would vary by either year or administration is
not clear. Without a compelling reason to so distinguish and with already low degrees of
freedom, we constrained this coefficient to be constant across sample years.
109. Infra p. 423.
110. Infra p. 424.
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cases where the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief on whether to
grant certiorari or on the substantive issues.
The regression reported in Table 3 includes six explanatory variables. 111 The coefficient for the reversal rate variable is positive and
highly significant, and it supports the strategic management hypotheses about the Supreme Court: the outcomes are highly correlated for cases granted certiorari from a single circuit court within a
small number of years. 112 Finally we include a dummy variable for
labor cases, as during this period the Court was systematically more
likely to affirm cases that involved the labor agencies (the Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Board) than for
other cases.
Coefficients for the government selection and deference effects are
both positive and significant, consistent with our main hypotheses.
How important is the selection effect? Interpreting logit coefficients
is not straightforward. Because the logistic curve is nonlinear, the effect of a single variable depends on the values that other variables
assume for each observation. A useful way to evaluate the results is
to consider the difference in the likelihood of reversal for the cases
that we hypothesize are subject to the selection bias: those where the
government petitioned for review at the Supreme Court but not at
any lower court. There are ninety such cases in the subexample used
in the estimation, of which 79% were reversed (that is, the government position prevailed) and 21% were affirmed. We calculated for
each of these cases the predicted likelihood of reversal if the government had petitioned these cases for review, but the additional selection effect did not hold—that is, allowing for the relative esteem that
the Supreme Court held for the appellate court under review and for
a progovernment bias in the case due to the preferences of the Supreme Court rather than strategic selection by the executive branch.
In this case, we estimate that the expected number of reversals
would be 65% of the total.
From these estimates, we can infer how many cases the Solicitor
General declined to petition for review that, absent selection, we
would predict that the Supreme Court would have reviewed and affirmed. In the actual sample, seventy-one cases were reversed, or
79% of the ninety cases in this category. For seventy-one cases to be
65% of the sample, the sample would have to include thirty-eight
cases where the government lost, or a total of 109 cases rather than
111. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 27, at 432-33, for further model specifications
and discussion of the sample and estimation. The alternate specifications explore differences in selection and deference over time and by issue area. Results for the selection bias
reported here are robust in these more complicated specifications.
112. In Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 27, at 470, we consider a fixed effects (conditional
logit) model which yields the same qualitative results for the variables of interest here.
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ninety. Thus, the estimates here predict that the Solicitor selected
out nineteen cases.
As is discussed above, our coefficient for the selection effect is
likely to be biased down for two reasons. First, we are ascribing any
selection bias that might take place prior to circuit court appeals to a
deference effect rather than a selection effect. Second, an asymmetric
settlement strategy by the government will weaken the measured selection effect. Thus, the extent to which we can estimate the selection
effect is likely to be understated. Given this bias, our result that in
the cases where we can measure selection, the government may be
withholding 20% of the cases that the Supreme Court would like to
review is a substantial number—certainly sufficient to give credence
to the concerns discussed in the first Parts of this paper.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR A DMINISTRATIVE L AW
The government-petitioner advantage produces several implications for administrative law. We consider here the implications of the
analysis for private parties versus the government and for the judiciary versus the executive, and we offer some preliminary comments
about the implication of our analysis for statutory design.
A. The Government-Petitioner Advantage and the Coase Theorem
Part II assumes that the cost of an affirmance by the Supreme
Court is zero for a private (local) party and positive for the government. The affirmance cost modeled, however, is only the cost to the
private potential petitioner. More generally, there is a cost associated
with a Supreme Court affirmance and possibly a benefit with a reversal, which includes the costs imposed on and the benefits enjoyed
by similarly situated parties in other circuits, now subject to the decision of the original reviewing court. By petitioning the Supreme
Court to review weak cases, the private party imposes a potential externality on similarly situated firms or individuals in other circuits. 113 By settling strong cases, rather than pursuing them to the
Supreme Court, the private party denies similarly situated firms or
individuals potential benefits.
These external costs will only show up in a subset of the cases.
Where the first circuit court to address an issue resolves it in favor of
the government, then there may be no external cost. The government
113. The externality here is from a change in law, rather than costs and deterrence, as
analyzed by Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
371 (1986), Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997), and Susan RoseAckerman & Mark Geistfeld, The Divergence Between Social and Private Incentives to Sue:
A Comment on Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 483 (1987), who consider
social costs of private law rather than the issues that arise in public or administrative law.
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is already pursuing its own policies in all the circuits, and an affirmance by the Supreme Court will not change the law that is being
applied in any of the circuits. 114 However, if there have been prior circuit court cases favorable to private parties in other circuits, an affirmance of a case favorable to the government may impose costs on
other private parties. 115 The affirmance will overturn doctrine favorable to private parties in other circuits. The private party who is considering appealing will not take the external costs into account when
making its decision.
This is a standard problem of the commons. The nonstandard feature of the problem is the asymmetry in calculations among types of
litigants. The government petitioner does not suffer from a failure of
the commons. The federal bureaucracy, through strategic choice of
appeal, can avoid, for a while, judicial decisions to its disadvantage
while promptly pursuing those with broader positive impacts for the
bureaucracy. Other parties have negative decisions imposed relatively promptly but may experience a delay in decisions to their favor. Thus, in administrative cases, the federal structure of judicial
review works to the advantage of the federal bureaucracy over regulated parties.
“But why,” those of us raised on the Coase Theorem116 might ask,
“doesn’t the market take care of this”? After all, in the absence of
transaction costs—perfect information, no bargaining costs, and no
strategic bargaining—those who stand to gain or lose by a private
litigant’s decision to appeal will offer the private litigant some money
to change his mind. If the external costs are large enough to justify a
payment to the private litigant to induce him to change his behavior,
then those who stand to gain or lose will pay enough to change the
decision. That is precisely what our example of the Taxman case, discussed in Part II.A.1, shows. There may be a transfer of resources,
but the set of cases brought by private parties to the Supreme Court
should have just as strong a petitioner advantage as the government
cases have.
This analysis is internally consistent but wrongly applied to this
setting. Information is far from perfect. To be sure, some industry
trade associations try to track the external impacts of some cases in
the federal courts. However, this activity can only track a fraction of
114. We thank Dan Gifford for pointing this out to us in comments on a prior draft.
115. This presumes that the government is not engaging in intracircuit nonacquiesence.
116. See Coase, supra note 48, at 1 (1960); see also Philippe Aghion & Benjamin He rmalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. &
O RG. 381 (1990); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Robert Cooter, The Cost of
Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982); Richard D. McKelvey & Talbot Page, Taking the Coase
Theorem Seriously, ECON. & PHIL., Oct. 1999, at 235, 246-47.
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the potentially important cases. Second, there will be significant bargaining costs in persuading a private litigant to forego an appeal.
Third, there may be substantial strategic posturing by private parties hoping to “free ride” on the efforts of others to head off potentially damaging petitions. This would include firms hoping that other
firms in the same industry would pay a potential appellant not to
bring the appeal. It might also include organizations like the NAACP
or the NRA, hoping to avoid the negative affects of an affirmance.
For all of these reasons, we cannot expect bargaining and contracting
between appellants and third parties adversely affected by the appeals to “correct” the set of cases brought to the Supreme Court. Instead, we can expect imperfect information, transaction costs, and
strategic behavior to produce a government-petitioner advantage at
the Supreme Court. This is exactly what our statistical analysis confirms.
B. Private Parties vs. the Government
When an attorney for a private party advises a client who is subject to a form of government regulation, part of the attorney’s advice
must be based on a prediction of what the courts might do if an administrative rule or order is challenged in court. To make that prediction, the attorney usually reads, among other things, the extant
case law from the Supreme Court. The attorney’s “best reading” of
the law is to include his or her appraisal of the arguments for and
against the winning parties in each of the cases, the similarity between the facts and issues of decided cases and the interests of the
client, the degree to which the passage of time has changed the
membership or views of important justices, and so on. We believe
that all of these things are important.
However, our results show that there is something else that is just
as important as the considerations just mentioned. In particular, the
attorney should consider sets of cases that never got to the Supreme
Court because of the government-petitioner advantage. Cases which
the government might well have lost if appealed to the Supreme
Court were systematically weeded out before the Supreme Court got
a chance to make its judgments and issue decisions. Hence, the set of
decisions that the attorney gets to read will have an overabundance
of decisions for the government. In the process of making analogies
between decided cases and his or her own, the attorney will have a
much easier time making analogies to cases in which the government
wins than he would have had if there were no government-petitioner
advantage. As a result, it will be easy for the attorney to overestimate the government’s chances of winning in the Supreme Court.
Of course, the attorney can try to adjust for this advantage (after
reading this Article). He or she can say to himself or herself, “I know
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that there are some ? missing’ cases from the Supreme Court Reports
because the government refused to appeal (or settled out) some likely
losers.”117 However, the attorney has the difficult job of imagining
what might be in those cases and then trying to give them the proper
weight. This entire process seems difficult and fraught with error.
We suspect that such attorneys, like miners who failed to notice that
canaries had stopped singing, will neglect the import of cases that
have been weeded out by the government-petitioner advantage.
C. Academics
As we pointed out in the introduction to this Article, academics
read administrative law cases for many reasons. All of them are subject to the government-petitioner advantage. Our historical accounts,
our doctrinal analysis, our law reform efforts, and our big theories
are all predicated upon a reading of Supreme Court cases that have a
progovernment tendency. In some contexts this is more important
than in others. For example, pure historical work seems least affected. One who is chronicling “what happened” in administrative
law can, it seems to us, justifiably spend much less time worrying
about what might have happened if only the government were petitioning nonstrategically. 118 On the other hand, if we try to deduce the
Justices’ or the Court’s ideology and motivations by reading the
cases, perhaps in historical context, then the government-petitioner
advantage is more troublesome. 119 Strategic petitioning will have
weeded evidence of the antigovernment ideology out of the record.
The government-petitioner advantage will lead us to conclude mistakenly that the Justices embraced ideologies that were more statist
than was actually the case.

117. In addition, the attorney can read the lower court cases, perhaps note that they
tend to be slightly less friendly to the government, and then make estimates of winning in
the courts of appeal. However, without the adjustments in text, the attorney may still misestimate the chances of winning in the Supreme Court.
118. Even here, however, one can run into trouble, depending on what one means by
“what happened.” For example, some new left historians claim that 19th Century appellate
courts were biased in favor of the railroads and other large capitalist enterprises. See
HOROWITZ, supra note 51, at 48. If the logic of government-petitioner advantage also works
for large capitalist enterprises that operate in many circuits, and theory says that it
should, then the observed advantage in the case law might be, in part, a result of strategic
petitioning, rather than just the preferences of the judges.
119. Thus, the most important single article in administrative law, in our opinion,
Richard Stewart’s The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV . L. REV.
1667 (1975), possibly has some of these problems. Of course, if read as a synthetic historical account, explaining how the extant cases could be read in each era if one wanted to rationalize them, then the piece does not suffer from the government-petitioner advantage. It
is only if the article is read, in part, as trying to deduce what really motivated the Justices,
that the government-petitioner advantage becomes important. We can make similar obse rvations about the enormous volume of scholarship on the Chevron doctrine.
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Our law reform efforts may also suffer from the governmentpetitioner advantage. First, when deciding whether the existing system is “broken,” we read a censored record of Supreme Court opinions. We may be led to conclude mistakenly that there is (is not) a
problem when there really is not (is) one. Second, when we formulate
new suggested laws, they will be at variance with what may really be
“needed.” Third, unless we anticipate that the government will utilize our new suggested laws so as to minimize the chance of adverse
verdicts, our suggestions may miss the mark. 120 We academics can
try to adjust our thinking, just as practicing attorneys and judges
may try to adjust. We recommend trying to do so. However, we suspect that academics will do no better than our brothers and sisters in
practice.
D. Judges vs. Bureaucrats
Our model also has implications for the relative authority of the
branches of government. This result is easiest to conceptualize in a
zero-litigation world. Recall that in a zero-litigation cost model, the
private party always appeals a loss it obtained at a lower court. Only
the government appeals selectively. In this simplified world, our
model predicts a ratchet (in the short term) into the Supreme Court’s
ability to change administrative law. If the Court wants to move in a
progovernment direction, it will have plenty of cases to adjudicate.
Cases that are likely to be useful for progovernment rulings will
move through the courts and up to the Supreme Court at a reasonable clip. When the government controls the appellate decision (for
example, it has lost at a lower court), it will appeal cases up through
the courts. Alternatively, when the private party loses in a lower
court, it always appeals. Thus, the Supreme Court has its choice for
cases that will be useful for changing policy in favor of a government
policy or position.
When the Supreme Court wants to move in an antigovernment direction, the situation is more complex. Under the same set of assumptions as above, it will receive cases only from private parties;
the government itself will not petition such cases for review. Thus, if
the lower courts have generally ruled in favor of the government,
then a private party can appeal the relevant cases and the Supreme
Court will be able to put into effect its policy change. Alternatively, if
the lower courts have ruled against the government, then the government controls the agenda, and the Supreme Court gets rolled.
Whether the Supreme Court receives cases in which it might
change precedent, then, depends on the actions of the lower courts. If
120. For a recent piece integrating law reform, big thinking, and strategic considerations, see Freeman, supra note 9.
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these courts anticipate a change in precedent by the Supreme Court,
assuming that the government anticipates the change (and we expect
no less of the lower federal courts) and if the lower courts want to
further the interests of the Supreme Court, then their appropriate
strategy is to rule counter to what they believe the Supreme Court
will ultimately do; that is, they should set themselves up to be reversed.
We have never seen any evidence of this type of strategic behavior. Under the more standard scenario, the lower courts will on occasion reverse the government when it expects that action from the
Supreme Court. The implication is that the Supreme Court will not
get the cases it may want or need to change policy in an antigovernment direction.
Furthermore, the more disposed the courts are against the government, the more tilted the system is in favor of the government.
The relevant comparison here is between a situation where the
courts, in unity, are inclined to rule against the federal bureaucracy
versus the reverse case where the courts, again in unity, are inclined
to rule against local concerns. With a high likelihood of obtaining review and then failing at the Supreme Court, the bureaucracy is most
unlikely to appeal relative to the optimal strategy of a local party. Of
course, if literally every circuit ruled against the government, the
federal bureaucracy would presumably find it difficult to maintain a
credible justification for nonacquiescence. However, up to a point,
such an argument is plausible, and substantial delays in modifying
policies towards those favored by the courts are possible.
The situation described in the preceding paragraph may be a reasonable characterization of the position of the courts and some of the
federal bureaucracies in the early part of the Reagan Administration.
Two Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) cases under
the leadership of Secretary Heckler are held as models of nonacquiescence, and they are responsible for the perception that the policy of
nonacquiescence was created as a crisis in judicial policy.121 After
Reagan’s election, HHS sharply modified some welfare and disability
policies, which unleashed a rash of litigation at the district courts.
HHS lost these cases, they were not appealed, and HHS did not modify its policies—the classic case of nonacquiescence.122 Only later—
after Reagan had appointed Supreme Court Justices—did such cases
reach the Supreme Court. 123

121. See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding intracircuit nonacquiescence is a per se violation of separation of powers doctrine); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F.
Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (barring intracircuit nonacquiescence).
122. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 62, at 699-702.
123. See id. at 699 & n.95.

420

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:391

E. Statutory Design
This analysis suggests some mechanisms by which the extent of
the probureaucrat advantage can be modified through statute. If we
suppose that the enacting coalition of legislators and the President
had determined the desirable mix of judicial and bureaucratic authority over a regulatory area, what statutory provisions would ensue?
The legislature could control, in part, the degree of governmentpetitioner advantage by controlling the extent to which judicial review is split into more and smaller components. More circuits, more
levels of review, and more ways to distinguish local results from national ones would likely exacerbate the commons problem for local
concerns and the extent to which government and local incentives diverge. These would tend to reduce the relative authority of the judiciary and disadvantage the targets of regulation. Alternatively,
statutory provisions that specify direct appeal to higher courts would
work in the reverse manner.
Statutory provisions that affect the justification for nonacquiescence play a similar role. The greater the latitude for nonacquiescence, the more costly to the government is a Supreme Court loss
relative to a circuit court loss. Thus, statutory provisions that allow
multiple venues work to the advantage, in this respect, of the bureaucracy; those that require appeals to be taken to the D.C. Circuit
(or the Federal Circuit) empower the judiciary and regulated parties.
F. Limits of the Analysis
All of the above implications for administrative law presume that
the increased number of cases in favor of the government worked
their way into the law of administrative agencies. The most likely
mechanism is the common law method, based on analogical reasoning. The more cases there are that rule in favor of the government,
the easier it will be to find decided cases with fact situations and
stated rationales that are similar to any given case that is being litigated. Thus, the government-petitioner advantage should make it
easier for the government to win in the future.
If the Supreme Court can issue decisions with broad rules and rationales that clearly are more important than other cases, the connection between the government-petitioner advantage and administrative law is rendered less obvious. If the Supreme Court can issue a
decision that is against the government and is clearly much more
important than several progovernment decisions, then “the law” cannot be determined by counting cases. Instead, one would have to do
an analysis of content and importance to assess whether the government-petitioner advantage had an influence on the law. We take no

2000]

GOVERNMENT LITIGANT ADVANTAGE

421

position on this question in this Article, leaving its resolution for future scholarship.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a model of rational appeals in public
law which suggests that the government will selectively petition the
Supreme Court for review—much more so than other petitioners do
on average. The empirical results support the hypothesis that the selectivity matters: the government petitions so little that the Court is
constrained in its certiorari choices, and the docket will overall appear more favorable to the government than the Court would want.
In brief, the government will not appeal cases where it fears an adverse decision. The Court will have to wait for a different party to
appeal such cases, which might take a while, particularly if the lower
courts and the Supreme Court decide cases in a similar way.
This asymmetry results from three aspects of the American judicial system. First, only losers can appeal. When the government consistently loses, it can avoid higher levels of review, for only it has the
power to appeal. Second, the hierarchical structure of American
courts means that the lower court decisions need not be authoritative, particularly (indeed, uniquely) for a federal litigant. Finally, as
de Tocqueville observed, the American courts must wait for an appeal. They are structured to be reactive rather than proactive in
choosing topics to adjudicate. Our analysis shows that this structure
inherently limits the power of the courts relative to the executive
branch of government.
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Table 1: Supreme Court Outcomes by Status of
the Federal Government

Government
Status

Supreme Court Outcome

Total

Affirm

Reverse

Respondent

128
59.8%

86
40.2%

214
100%

Petitioner

72
29.3%

174
70.7%

246
100%

No Government
Participation

146
42.6%

197
57.4%

343
100%

Total

346
43.1%

457
56.9%

803
100%
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Table 2. Supreme Court Outcomes by Case Type

Case Type

Appellate
Court
Decision

Gov’t
Status at
Supreme
Court

Type I:
DC ruled
against gov’t;
gov’t
appealed to
Circuit Ct.

Affirm
District Ct.; Petitioner
against
govt.
Reverse
District Ct.; Respondent
for gov’t

Type II:

Against
gov’t
For gov’t

Supreme Court
Outcome*
Affirm

Total

Reverse

38
38.4%

61
61.6%

99
100%

40
64.5%

22
35.5%

62
100%

Petitioner

9
27.3%

24
72.7%

33
100%

Respondent

17
60.7%

11
39.3%

28
100%

Reverse
District Ct.; Petitioner
against

25
21.9%

89
78.1%

114
100%

Affirm
District Ct.; Respondent
for gov’t

71
57.3%

53
42.7%

124
100%

Against
gov’t

Petitioner

34
23.1%

113
76.9%

147
100%

For gov’t

Respondent

88
58%

64
42%

152
100%

Affirm
District Ct

87
43.1%

115
56.9%

202
100%

No gov’t
participation Reverse
District Ct

59
41.8%

82
58.2%

141
100%

346
43.1%

457
56.9%

803
100%

Direct
Appeals to
Circuit Ct.
Type II:
DC ruled for
gov’t; other
party
appealed to
Circuit Ct.

All Type II
Cases

Type III:

All Cases

*bold entries indicate decision in favor of the government
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Table 3: Regression Results (Logit Regression)
Dependent Variable: Probability of Reversal at the Supreme Court
Independent Variables

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Government selection
(“z”: government petitioner;
Type II case)

.758**

.383

Court deference to government
(“y”: institutional advantage of
government litigant)

.559**

.151

2.322**

.450

Reversal rate of cases
from same circuit
(“x”: management effect)
Labor cases

Appeal from DC or
Federal Circuit
Circuit Court affirmed
District Court

Constant
** p < .05
* p < .10

-1.199*

-.730**

.676

.337

.081

.205

-1.007**

.314
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Figure 1: Supreme Court Reversal Rate
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